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Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a
"Right" to Dissent?
by
RORY K. LITTLE*
Speaking "In Defense of Dissents" toward the end of his career,
Justice Brennan closed with an assertion that a "right to dissent" is
"one of the great and cherished freedoms that we enjoy by reason of
the excellent accident of our American births."' Having written
approximately 471 substantive dissenting opinions in his 34 Terms on
the Court2 (and over 2,300 total dissents if you include his death
penalty and other dissents from stays or denials of certiorari3), Justice
* Assoc. Prof., Hastings College of the Law. I had the privilege and pleasure of
clerking for Justice Brennan during the 1984-85 Term. I am grateful for comments, if not
endorsement, from Vik Amar, Ash Bhagwat, Evan Caminker, Joseph Grodin, Ed
Hartnett, Calvin Massey and Josh Rosenkranz, and for assistance from Steven Brundage,
Katy Hull, and Beverly Taylor.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 438 (1986)
(delivered as the Tobriner lecture at University of California, Hastings College of the Law
in November 1985).
2. While Justice Brennan was prodigious by any measure, precise counts of his
opinions are surprisingly hard to come by. In a tributary book published shortly before
Justice Brennan died in 1997, both he and Justice Souter (who assumed Justice Brennan's
seat on the Supreme Court in 1990) reported that Justice Brennan had issued 1,360
opinions of various kinds during his tenure. See REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE
BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 17,301 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz
eds., 1997). Justice Brennan broke this down to 461 majority opinions, 425 dissents, and
474 "other opinions." Id. at 17. My own review of 34 volumes of the Harvard Law
Review, which annually publishes Supreme Court statistics, from 1957 through 1990 yields
slightly different numbers (counting only once those opinions that were intended to apply
to more than one case): 471 dissenting opinions, 452 majorities, and 219 concurrences, for
a total of 1,142 merits opinions. See 70 HARV. L. REv. 101, tbl. IV (1957) through 104
HARv. L. REV. 359, tbl. 1 (1990). This accords at least roughly with Justice Souter's own
breakdown. See David H. Souter, Justice Brennan's Place in Legal History, in REASON
AND PASSION, supra, at 301 ("[Ajfter subtracting per curiams, chambers opinions, and
dissents from denial of certiorari, there are still nearly 1,200 [Brennan opinions] left.").
3. A computerized search of the Lexis Supreme Court library for "Dissentby
(Brennan)" yields 2,346 case citations (which must encompass dissents from denials of
certiorari). "Concurby (Brennan)" yields 288 citations and "Opinionby (Brennan)" yields
478 citations.
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Brennan likely thought this proposition so obvious as to need no
separate defense, and it was accompanied by no elaboration. But one
might ask-and I imagine it is a question that would have intrigued
Justice Brennan-what foundation exists for a claimed "right" of
judges to publish dissenting opinions? Scant analysis of the claim
exists; it is either summarily asserted or denied by those who address
the general topic of dissents. 4
Today the Hastings Law Journal reprints Justice Brennan's "In
Defense of Dissents" essay as one of the most prominent pieces
published in its first 50 years. Well into his "dissenting" period by
1985,5 Justice Brennan sought to provide his principled rationale for
why, and when, a judge may properly dissent. His essay retains
complete vitality today as the most comprehensive and succinct
assemblage of justifications for dissenting judicial opinions. Below, in
Part I, I provide a bit more detail regarding Justice Brennan and his
opinions, and urge you to read his essay. Then in Part II, I use his
4. Prior authorities that even address the question are scarce. Karl ZoBell, in his
1959 survey of Supreme Court dissenting opinions, wrote that "a body of historical
precedent... clearly establishes the right of the individual Justices" to dissent. Karl M.
ZoBell, Division of Opinion in The Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration,
44 CORNELL L. REV. 186, 209 (1959). Yet as Professor Art Leff, late of Yale, used to
instruct, the word "clearly" usually means "I have no authority for what I am about to
say," and ZoBell does not further support his claim. Accord, Michael Mello, Adhering To
Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as
Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 685 (1995) ("[t]hinking of judges as
conscientious objectors... they have a legally protected right to dissent. In fact, everyone
knows they can dissent.... "); Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SUP.
Cr. REV. 227, 254-55 (by implication); see also Justice Story, infra note 53. In a related
vein, over 40 years ago Judge Michael Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
published his arguments for why the state's chief justice could not lawfully bar publication
of a Musmanno dissent, after his chief justice had prevailed with such an order. See Hon.
Michael A. Musmanno, Dissenting Opinions, 60 DICK. L. REV. 139 (1956); Musmanno v.
Eldridge, 114 A.2d 511 (Pa. 1955) (affirming denial of mandamus seeking to compel the
official reporter to print his dissent). Conversely, in her very helpful Note providing a
history of early Supreme Court dissents, Meredith Kolsky opines in a footnote without
elaboration that "judges and Justices probably do not enjoy a constitutional right to
dissent." Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court
Dissent, 83 GEo. L.J. 2069, 2086 n.89 (1995). See also Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of
Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1996) (justifying the "practice of
dissent" in the Supreme Court without any "rights" analysis).
5. According to the Harvard Law Review's statistics, see supra note 2, Justice
Brennan published only 60 substantive dissents in his first 14 Terms on the Court. Thus in
the first 41% of his time on the Court, Justice Brennan filed less than 13% of his total 471
dissents. Indeed, during one halcyon period of the Warren Court's dominance, Justice
Brennan filed only six dissents over five Terms (1965-1969), and filed none at all in 1968.
However, with the retirement of Warren in 1969, and the appointments of Chief Justice
Burger in 1969, Justice Blackmun in 1970, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1971,
Justice Brennan quickly went from over a decade of single-digit dissenting Terms to filing
a high of 29 dissents in Oct. Term 1972 (matched only once again, in Oct. Term 1983).
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essay as stimulus to consider, briefly, the separate question that
Justice Brennan never expressly addressed: are there constitutional
foundations for a judicial right to dissent?
I.
Since Justice Brennan retired in June 1990 and passed from our
midst in 1997, many others have penned his tributes. 6 His pithy essay,
originally delivered as the Tobriner lecture at Hastings in 1985 and
barely 12 pages long, has rightfully been cited regularly since it was
published.7 It will have lasting contemporary relevance for as long as
we depend on written judicial opinions to guide our polity (and do
not prohibit judges from dissenting).
Over the long course of his Supreme Court career, however,
Justice Brennan's forte was not really dissent but rather "counting to
five"-assembling majorities of the Court's nine Justices. 8 Moreover,
his talents were often showcased not in published opinions but in
persuasive internal memos and drafts, written to other Justices to
whom the opinions were formally assigned.9 Finally, as the Senior
Associate Justice for almost 15 years,10 Justice Brennan was a master
6. See, e.g., REASON AND PASSION, supra note 2; Memorial Dedication to Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 723-74 (1998) (nine commentators);
Symposium, Reason, Passion & the Progress of Law: Remembering and Advancing the
Constitutional Vision of Justice William J. Brennan, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 313
(1998) (symposium summary and three commentators); Evan H. Caminker, Morning
Coffee with Justice Brennan, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 3 (1998); Tribute to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., 26 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1991) (two commentators); A Tribute to
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1990) (six commentators). In fact,
tributes to Justice Brennan preceded his retirement by over two decades. See 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1966) (four tributes assessing Justice Brennan's first decade on the Court).
7. See, e.g., Social Sciences Citation Index.
8. See, e.g., Justice David Souter, Eulogy at the Funeral Mass of Justice Brennan, 7
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 2 (1998) ("While I was with him, he might tell me some things that
were true, like how to count to five."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Thousand Opinions, One
Voice, N. Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997, at A29; Fred Woocher, Tribute to Justice Brennan, 31
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 749,751 (1998).
9. In his eminently readable biography, Kim Eisler recounts the details of how Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reflected both structural
and substantive reliance on a memorandum written to him by Justice Brennan almost two
years earlier when the case was first argued. KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL:
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 224-33
(1993). Similarly, scholars have noted that it was Justice Brennan's internal redraft of
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion that enabled a majority to coalesce in the
landmark Terry v. Ohio opinion, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). See Symposium, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 721,821-27, 894-95, 908 (1998) (symposium on Terry). See also Souter, supra note 2,
at 306 ("Scholarship is turning up Brennan authorship and influence in significant opinions
that bear no Brennan name.").
10. Justice Douglas retired in November 1975, leaving Justice Brennan junior only to
the Chief Justice. See 423 U.S. iii, iv n.1 (1975).
April 19991 READING JUSTICE BRENNAN
in wielding the assignment power when his majority did not include
the Chief Justice-and because the Chiefs during this period were
Warren Burger and the "other Bill," Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Brennan was often in the opposite camp. When so positioned, Justice
Brennan frequently would assign the writing of significant majority
opinions to other, less certain Justices, in order (hopefully) to keep
them in the fold and tie them to the majority's result and rationale in
future cases.
Justice Brennan's was the art of compromise and behind the
scenes influence, not vitriolic dissent-arm-hugging, not twisting.
When other Justices requested changes in order to join his opinions,
Justice Brennan typically would quickly agree to make them (at times
to the consternation of his over-involved law clerks). Generally
credited as the "architect" of many pathbreaking Warren Court
opinions, Justice Brennan was also the architect of many surprising
majority opinions in the more conservative Burger-Rehnquist
courts.1 When his deep influence within the Warren Court is
evaluated together with his continued ability to assemble majorities
for another twenty-one years, Justice Brennan is easily credited as
being "the most influential Justice of his era," indeed, of this
century.12
When writing in dissent, as was increasingly the case in the last
half of his tenure,13 Justice Brennan was neither caustic nor trivial.
As his long-time friend Judge Abner Mikva has noted, "he knew how
to disagree without being disagreeable.' 1 4 Defending dissents in
1985, Justice Brennan wisely proclaimed that "[d]issent for its own
sake has no value, and can threaten the collegiality of the bench." 15
While Justice Brennan surely wrote some great dissents,16 he was not
11. For just a few examples, see EISLER, supra note 9, at 223-33 (Roe v. Wade, 1973),
243 (Furman v. Georgia, 1972), 251-55 (Nixon, 1974), 261-63 (Bakke, 1976), 275-77 (Texas
v. Johnson, 1989), 279-80 (Metro Broadcasting, 1990).
12. Sullivan, supra note 8 at 829; accord, EISLER, supra note 9, at 13. Justice Scalia, no
ideological companion of Justice Brennan, endorsed this evaluation after Justice Brennan
retired. See All Things Considered (Nat'l Pub. Radio, July 24, 1997) (available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Transcript No. 97072410-212, at *2) (Justice Scalia: "Bill Brennan is
probably the most influential [J]ustice of the century... [although] not in a direction that I
happen to agree with").
13. Fully 352 of Justice Brennan's 471 substantive dissents, see supra note 2, or 75%,
were filed in the last half of his Supreme Court career (1974-1990). See also supra note 5.
14. Abner J. Mikva, Reason, Passion & the Progress of Law: Remembering and
Advancing the Constitutional Vision of Justice William J. Brennan, 33 HARV. C.R-C.L. L.
REv. 325,331 (1998).
15. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435.
16. Justice Brennan gave some indication of his independence and courage as a
dissenter early on, when he issued his first merits dissent two months prior to the Senate's
confirmation of his recess appointment. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,
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a "Great Dissenter." We can leave that dubious sobriquet to other
Justices-Harlan, Douglas, Marshall, and Scalia-who sat during
Justice Brennan's remarkable tenure. 17 To my mind, the consistently
cordial, if at times deeply dismayed, character of Justice Brennan's
dissents is to his lasting credit.
Anyone interested in judicial dissents must read his wonderful
essay, written by a knowledgeable insider and explaining why dissents
"serve a very important purpose.' 8  "Dissents contribute to the
integrity of the [judicial] process" and "to the marketplace of
competing ideas."'19 Indeed, we accept and honor dissenting opinions
because they sometimes turn out to be right, often enough to remind
us unceasingly of the human frailty of the judicial process. Dissent,
therefore, when strongly felt and coolly reasoned, is a judicial
"obligation," as well as a right-and it is "very hard work" that judges
"cannot shirk. '20 Justice Brennan's essay defends dissents in words
that are hardly controversial and, one suspects, command a timeless
majority regardless of ideology.
II.
Rather than add more paper to the blizzard of praise that is
rightfully Justice Brennan's, I now want to turn, if only briefly, to a
question I am sure would have intrigued him: is there a right for
judges to dissent? Not just to express their disagreement in
newspaper editorials, law reviews, or from soapboxes-for surely
judges retain a general First Amendment right of expression no less
than other citizens-but rather a "right to issue dissenting opinions,"
260 (1957); 352 U.S. at iv n.3. Some of my personal favorites among Justice Brennan's
dissents are Cruzan, McKlesky, Teague, Elstad, Atkins v. Parker, Gregg v. Georgia, and
National League of Cities v. Usery. See also Harry A, Blackmun, A Tribute to Mr. Justice
Brennan, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991) (noting seven instances in which
positions advocated in Brennan's dissents were later adopted by the Court, or by
Congress, or in proposed legislation).
17. Justice Douglas, for example, asserted that "[tlhe right to dissent is the only thing
that makes life tolerable for a judge of an appellate court." WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS,
AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 (1960). Remarkably, Justice Brennan sat with one-fifth-22 of
108-of all the Justices who have ever served on the Supreme Court. See REASON AND
PASSION, supra note 2, at 17. Only five Justices in the Court's history served longer than
Justice Brennan (John Marshall, Stephen Field, Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas, and
John Marshall Harlan), and four of these five outlasted him only by a few weeks or
months, all leaving the bench after 34 years. Justice Douglas served 36 years, although
some have questioned his alertness in his last few years. See Linda Greenhouse, William
Brennan, 91, Dies; Gave Court Liberal Vision, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997, at Al; EISLER,
supra note 9, at 257.
18. Brennan, supra n.1, at 437.
19. 1& at 435.
20. Id. at 438.
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written explanations of their rationale for disagreement that must be
published in company with the official majority view?
As I discovered in preparing this essay, while many concerned
legal observers "want" there to be such a right, few are prepared to
defend it as constitutionally required. It may help to subdivide the
concept. Judicial dissent can be broken into three distinct
components: expressing disagreement to one's colleagues privately;
having one's disagreement with the majority's opinion publicly noted;
and issuing a written dissenting opinion in company with the
majority's. I wish to consider here a "complete" judicial right to
dissent, one that encompasses all three components: private voting,
public non-joinder, and written dissenting opinions. I suggest below
that the first two components are supported by the First Amendment.
The third component, however-a right to issue dissenting opinions-
must be founded on a constitutional conception of Article III
"courts" and "judges," because the First Amendment likely cannot
carry the right that far.
A. The Historical Tradition
The American judicial practice of issuing separate, disagreeing
opinions has a strong historical claim.2 1 Such opinions have been part
of the judicial scene in this country since before its founding. Early
American judges adopted the British tradition of seriatim opinion
writing, where each member of an appellate court presented his views
(there were then no "hers") in a separate writing, whether in sync
with the majority or not. 22 As Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice
Jacob Rush wrote in 1786, "However disposed to concur with my
Brethren in this cause, I have not been able to do it. Unanimity in
courts of justice, though a very desirable object, ought never to be
21. See generally, Kolsky, supra note 4, at 2072-73; ZoBell, supra note 4, at 190-92;
DONALD E. LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE LAW: SUPREME COURT DISSENTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT xxii-xxvi (1992); PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN
THE SUPREME COURT 20-21 (1969); see also infra notes 25 and 74. Worldwide, of course,
the practice of judicial dissent is "far from universal," and it is not permitted in many of
Europe's civil law systems. See Stack, supra note 4, at 2235 n.2 (collecting authorities).
22. ZoBell, supra note 4, at 190-91. ZoBell reminds us that Eighteenth century
judicial tribunals were quite different than today's, so that no historical analogies are
contemporaneously perfect. See id. at 192. For example, prior to independence the final
appeal from colonial courts was to England's Privy Council, a fundamentally Executive,
rather than judicial, body. See id. at 187-89. In addition, the institution of government-
paid "reporters" obligated to publish any judicial opinions did not arise until the 1800s.
See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on
Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1291, 1347 (1985). Thus the claim that a
dissenting opinion must be published rests, to some extent, on a post-Framing change in
practice. The right to issue such an opinion, however, does not.
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attained at the expense of sacrificing the judgment."23 Although
published dissents were reluctant and apparently uncommon, they
were accepted by early American courts when issued.24 As Justice
Iredell wrote in what has been identified as the earliest Supreme
Court dissent, "It is my misfortune to dissent from the opinions
entertained by the rest of the court... but I am bound to decide,
according to the dictates of my own judgment."25
History, therefore, might by itself sufficiently support a claimed
judicial right to dissent. Constitutional originalists might even find
the historical argument dispositive when determining the core
essentials of an Article III "judge."26 At the very least, history can aid
our understanding of the contemporaneous meaning that Article III
and the First Amendment might be accorded. But what more might
there be to a constitutional foundation for a judicial right to dissent?
B. The Right to Dissent-A Hypothetical Inquiry
The absence of any published scholarly opinion on the topic has
led me to take some informal polls. Most people I have asked
initially respond "of course there is a right to dissent-or at least
there should be." They then ask what causes me to ask such an odd
question: is there some current, serious threat to the practice of
dissenting opinions? The answer, thankfully, is no (although there
are some historical precedents2 7 and Justice Kline's case, discussed
23. Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 193, 202 (1830 ed.)(Pa. High Ct. of Err. &
App. 1786) (3d ed. 1830) (Rush, J. dissenting).
24. Noted comparative law scholar Professor Kurt Nadelman explained in 1959 that
although there is no practice of public dissents in some other countries, in the United
States "[t]he right to announce a dissent was never questioned" even in the Supreme
Court's earliest era. Kurt H. Nadelman, The Judicial Dissent: Publication Versus Secrecy,
in CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE - SELECTED ESSAYS 363,367
(1972).
25. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 415 (1793) (IredeUl, J., dissenting).
Professor Michael Mello reminds us that because judicial opinions were delivered orally at
this time, and the reporting of court opinions was unofficial and somewhat haphazard, we
cannot be certain that we have a full and accurate record of all such opinions. See Mello,
supra note 4, at 606. See also supra note 22.
26. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334,358 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. In 1923, former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Alex Simpson reported that
in 1845, Pennsylvania enacted a statute which, after establishing an official state supreme
court reporter of decisions, went on to direct that "no minority opinions of the said
[supreme] court shall be published by said reporter." Alex Simpson, Jr., Dissenting
Opinions, 71 U. PA. L. REv. 205, 208 (1923) (alteration in the original) (citation omitted).
See also Musmanno, supra note 4. Justice Simpson also reported that in 1627, and
continued in an 1833 Act, the British Privy Council directed that "[w]hen the business [of
that tribunal] is to be carried according to the most voices, no publication is afterwards to
be made by any man, how the particular voices and opinions went." Id. at 207. Karl
April 1999] READING JUSTICE BRENNAN
below in section C, raises some eyebrows). We all then quickly agree
that permitting judges to dissent is wise policy, whether or not
constitutionally required.
But strong desire and good policy cannot substitute for analysis
of whether the Constitution can bear the weight of dissent as a right.
It is a bold claim to assert that judges have a "right" to issue
dissenting opinions. I seek here only to explore, rather than to
establish, the proposition. But consider the following hypothetical:
After reciting undoubtedly "rational" findings regarding (1) the
expenditure of scarce resources involved in publishing dissents, (2)
the distraction of judges from their already over-burdened duties that
the preparation of dissents necessarily involves, (3) the destabilizing
effect that public expression of dissenting views can have on the law
and on judicial institutions,28 and (4) the alternative forums
(newspapers, law journals, soapboxes) that are readily available to
judges to publicize strongly held dissenting views,2 9 Congress passes
and the President signs a statute something like the following:
No judge shall be permitted to issue, and no
governmental resources may be used to publish,
opinions or other written memoranda that dissent
from legitimately decided majority judgments
issued by a court on which the judge sits.
Would such a statute be lawful? Or is there a constitutional right
to dissent that would trump it?30
ZoBell, however, explains that this compelled unanimity in the Privy Council resulted
from its essentially executive-branch character, which greatly distinguishes it from a true
ban on judicial dissents. See ZoBell, supra note 4, at 188.
28. This view was expressed perhaps most vehemently by Justice Edward White,
notably in dissent: "The only purpose which an elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is
to weaken the effect of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of confidence
in the conclusions of courts of last resort." Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429, 608 (1895) (White, J., dissenting). See also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
72 (1958); CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67
(1928). See infra notes 55 and 57. It is ironic how often criticisms of dissent appear in
dissenting opinions-a rather obvious, it would seem, psychological disarming technique.
See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("I think it is useless and undesirable, as a rule, to... dissent.... ").
29. See e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. "Process",
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313 (1999); John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1011 (1993).
30. Of course, so far as I am aware, no such federal statute has ever been proposed,
and because it is so unlikely it may seem even a poor law school hypothetical. But see
supra note 27. Here, as Professor Gunther has noted in related context, "Itihe oft-heard
admonition about the distinction between constitutionality and wisdom bears special
emphasis." Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 898 (1984). One
might speculate that the lack of articulated rationales for the right to dissent, see supra
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Two constitutional arguments, at least, present themselves in
favor of the proposition. First, the First Amendment always comes to
mind when some sort of expression is being regulated. Yet while
freedom of speech may well support part of the claim-that judges
have the right to privately express and publicly note that they dissent
from a majority judgement or opinion-it may well not support the
full-blown claim that dissenting judges have a right to issue
accompanying opinions that explain their dissenting views. Second,
however, the Constitution employs the words "Courts" and "Judges"
to describe actors in the judicial branch.31  It can be argued, d la
Professor Hart,32 that a right to issue dissenting opinions is part of an
irreducible core meaning of these terms, without which the
constitutional actor is being unconstitutionally constrained. This
position contends that a court cannot be a "Court" nor a judge a
"Judge" in the constitutional sense without including a right to issue
dissenting opinions.33
One can of course imagine Justice Brennan's immediate reaction
to the hypothetical statute. As noted, he spoke in his 1985 essay of
the "cherished right to dissent," and in one of his most controversial
"count to five" majority opinions-Texas v. Johnson, popularly
known as the "flag burning" case, written in his next-to-last term-
Justice Brennan wrote that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '34
note 4, has resulted from uniform agreement that a serious threat to the right is unwise
and implausible. But see infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text (discussing current
disciplinary proceedings against dissenting California appellate Justice Kline).
31. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall...") (emphasis added). Needless to say, "be permitted to issue dissenting opinions"
is not an explicit part of this omitted constitutional "shall" clause.
32. See infra text accompanying note 66.
33. There may also be a statutory argument, at least for the U.S. Supreme Court,
although the argument of course would not overcome a subsequent congressional act such
as that hypothesized in the text. Title 28 U.S.C. § 411 (1994) directs that "[t]he decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States shall be printed, bound, and distributed." An
argument can be made that the court's "decisions" must include all prepared opinions,
even of dissenters. When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to publish one of its
justice's dissents (which had been delivered late to the reporter), the dissenting justice
published a law review article noting this statutory point and arguing that "[t]he
Dissenting Opinions of the United States Supreme Court have always been regarded as
part of its official decisions." Musmanno, supra note 4, at 139.
34. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). Whether a ban on all dissenting
opinions is "content based" or "content neutral" presents a rather nice constitutional
question. One could say that such a ban is based on the very fact that the content of a
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In this he echoed his famous majority of a quarter century earlier
in New York Times v. Sullivan, which endorsed America's "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. ' 35 While the practice
of dissenting opinions benefited from explication in Justice Brennan's
"Dissents" essay, the "right to dissent" itself was, for Justice Brennan,
too obvious to debate.
But while Justice Brennan might have needed no persuasion, it
may be instructive for the more skeptical to sketch-or, in light of the
necessary brevity of an introductory essay, to suggest a caricature of
the sketch-constitutional arguments that might support a full right
of judicial dissent. The question is of current interest in California,
because a respected state appellate judge, Presiding Justice J.
Anthony Kline, has recently faced judicial disciplinary charges of
"willful misconduct in office" for having issued a dissent from
application of his state supreme court's law.3 6
C. The Kline Proceedings
In a 1997 appeal which the parties had agreed to resolve by a
"stipulated reversal" (that is, a settlement of the case conditioned on
an order vacating the adverse judgment below), Justice Kline refused
to join the two-judge majority granting the dismissal and reversal,
although he acknowledged that the California Supreme Court had
settled the legality of such stipulated reversals in a prior decision.37 In
his published dissent, Justice Kline noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court had subsequently ruled contrarily to the California Supreme
Court (but under federal law)38 and that it was his "deeply felt
dissenting opinion is disagreeable to the majority view. Yet the ban would apply to all
dissents, regardless of their content-that is, it would not matter which five-Justice bloc
"won." Nevertheless, it is the expression of disagreement that would seem to underlie a
ban on dissents. "[B]y any common sense understanding of the term, the ban.., is
'content based."' City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993).
Whether or not current doctrine requires strict scrutiny (and whether in fact the
categorization decision really makes a difference in result, as opposed to being result-
driven), it seems likely that Justice Brennan would so conclude. See Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting a "secondary effects" test to
recast speech regulations as content neutral).
35. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
36. See Inquiry Concerning Justice J. Anthony Kline, No. 151, California Commission
on Judicial Performance, Notice of Formal Proceedings 1 (June 30, 1998) [hereinafter
Inquiry].
37. See Morrow v. Hood Communications, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 491 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) (Kline, J., dissenting) (noting that Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 834 P.2d
119 (Cal. 1992) "requires that the motion before us be granted").
38. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18,26 (1994)
(ruling unanimously that, as a matter of equitable principles, while parties may of course
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opinion" that the California Supreme Court's prior ruling was not just
"analytically flawed and empirically unjustified" but also "destructive
of judicial institutions. '39 He wrote that he could not "as a matter of
conscience" apply the superior court's ruling, and stated that this was
one of the "rare instances in which the judge of an inferior court can
properly refuse to acquiesce in the precedent established by a court of
superior jurisdiction. '40 Six months later, the California Commission
on Judicial Performance, a state judicial disciplinary body, filed a
formal notice of possible discipline against Justice Kline, based upon
his dissent.41
It is important to note what Justice Kline did not do. First, he did
not author a majority opinion which actually refused to apply a higher
precedent-the parties in fact obtained the stipulated reversal to
which they were entitled under state law. Second, Justice Kline did
not refuse to implement a direct order from a higher court, nor did he
repeatedly dissent once the California Supreme Court made clear
that it would not reconsider its stipulated-reversal doctrine.42  The
"settle" an appeal, they are not entitled to vacatur of the judgment below absent
demonstration of "entitlement" to such an "extraordinary remedy"). See also Lundquist
v. Reusser, 875 P.2d 1279, 1283 n.8 (Cal. 1994)(declining to dismiss an appeal, despite the
parties' settlement, because the issues presented were of "continuing public importance").
Notably, on September 29, 1999, California's Governor signed legislation that prohibits
"stipulated reversals" unless the appellate court finds that vacatur does not harm public
and non-party interests, effectively overriding Neary. See Davis Signs Ban On 'Stipulated
Reversals,' THE DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 30, 1999, at A3.
39. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491.
40. Id. at 491,490 (citing Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) and Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the
Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1041 (1987)).
41. The charges were subsequently dismissed, although not until one year and
substantial costs later. See infra note 46. In support of its charges, the Judicial
Performance Commission has cited the California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 2A
(refusal to comply with the law) and 3B (2) (refusal to follow established law). In
response, Justice Kline not only denied these claims, but also relied (inter alia) on Canon 1
of the same code, describing the judicial duty to "uphold the integrity and independence
of the judiciary." Verified Answer, Inquiry Concerning Justice J. Anthony Kline, No. 151.
at 3 7 (Sept. 4, 1998). It is neither the goal nor the burden of this Essay to opine on the
validity of these claims.
42. In fact, Justice Kline identified significant intervening reasons to believe that his
Supreme Court might, or should, change its view. See supra text and accompanying notes
38 and 39. However, when the California Supreme Court took up the Morrow case on its
own motion (since, by virtue of the stipulated reversal, no dissatisfied party remained to
appeal), it voted 5-2 not to grant review. Once the supreme court made it clear that it was
not prepared to reexamine its precedent, Justice Kline recused himself from future
stipulated reversal cases. See Verified Answer, supra note 41, at 6 17.
In his dissent, Justice Kline also stated that he "will refuse to apply the Neary rule" in
future cases, although he would "of course comply with an order of the California
Supreme Court to grant a particular request for a stipulated reversal, a purely ministerial
act." 59 Cal. App. 4th at 930. The California Commission on Judicial Performance recited
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legitimate "hierarchical precedent" concerns that such action might
evoke are not unavoidably presented by a lone dissent, devoid of
power or effect other than its persuasive content. I do not believe a
"right to dissent" must also necessarily imply a "right to defy
precedent." The concepts are separable, and the arguments that
Professor Evan Caminker has detailed to deny the latter claim
persuasively need not also deny a right simply to issue an opinion
disagreeing with precedent. 43
Notably, the other two judges on Justice Kline's intermediate
three-judge appellate panel issued a majority opinion in which they
granted the stipulated reversal but also "respectfully stat[ed]" their
agreement with Justice Kline's substantive views, and urged that the
case presented an "appropriate vehicle through which the Supreme
Court should reconsider and repudiate the doctrine" previously
adopted.44 Thus these judges also stated their disagreement with the
higher court's earlier decision. Yet they were not charged with
judicial misconduct. Justice Kline, therefore, appears to have faced
discipline solely for the chosen vehicle of his expression of
disagreement: a dissenting opinion, rather than a concurrence (or a
recusal).45 Although the charges against Justice Klein have recently
been dismissed, two arguments, sketched below, suggest that he may
have had constitutional defenses.46
D. The First Amendment Argument
The First Amendment 47 generally prohibits government-coerced
this promise of continued refusal as part of the charges in its Notice of Formal
Proceedings, see note 36, supra, at 2. However, because Justice Kline has in fact recused
himself from all such subsequent cases, the issue of a repeated refusal to follow precedent
was not actually before the Commission in his case.
43. See Caminker, supra note 40, at 856-65. See also infra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text. Professor Caminker's article addresses a duty of "inferior" courts to
follow precedent. Thus Justice Brennan, who sat as an equal on the highest court in the
land, could repeatedly dissent from the majority's views on precedent (for example,
regarding the death penalty), without invoking the hierarchical arguments that might
forbid such a practice by an intermediate appellate or trial judge. See Brennan, supra note
1, at 437.
44. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490.
45. Thus the issue of "content neutral" versus "content based" is starkly presented
(see supra note 34): Justice Kline found himself in hot water for the manner of his
disagreement, not the disagreement itself. See Inquiry, supra note 36, at 2.
46. As this essay went to press, the California Commission dismissed the charges
against Justice Klein, noting (consistent with this essay) that judges "must be able" to
creatively express disagreement "free from fear of discipline for the free expression of
their ideas." See Decision and Order of Dismissal at 2, Inquiry Concerning Justice J.
Anthony Kline, No. 151 (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance, Aug. 19, 1999).
47. Which, it bears reminding, provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech .... By virtue of the due process clause in the
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statements of belief. Justice Jackson's poetry in Barnette has
withstood the test of over half a century of polarized political
applications: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official.., can.., force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith" in philosophies that they in fact dispute.48
By operation of this principle, the Court has struck down laws
requiring loyalty oaths, laws compelling newspapers to print
statements written by their editorial opponents, laws requiring drivers
to display an offensive motto on their license plates, and laws
requiring parade organizers to admit groups they do not wish to
support.49
Moreover, "compelled speech" and "compelled silence" are held
to the same high level of constitutional scrutiny, because (as Justice
Brennan wrote for seven Justices in one of those late-career
majorities) "'freedom of speech' ... necessarily compris[es] the
decision of both what to say and what not to say."'50 Thus it is
generally unconstitutional to compel persons to remain silent when
they would rather speak, as well as to compel them to speak ideas
they do not believe 5
Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment provides protection against state action as
well. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
48. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
49. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking New Hampshire laws
prohibiting drivers from obscuring "Live Free or Die" license plate motto); Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking Florida law requiring publication of
replies from political candidates whom the papers criticized editorially); Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (striking requirement that
parade organizers admit gay group); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (striking
loyalty oath dependent on denying Communist Party membership); but cf. Cole v.
Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972) (upholding oath merely requiring affiant to "uphold and
defend" the Constitution).
50. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988). See also Wooley,
430 U.S. at 714 (The First Amendment "includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.") (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J.,
concurring)).
51. This is "generally" true because finding the First Amendment to be implicated
does not end constitutional analysis; the government's asserted interests must then be
measured and balanced to see if they perhaps outweigh the burden on free speech. See
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-64 (1994). When a speech regulation is
content-based, it must survive "the most exacting scrutiny," a normally fatal-in-fact strict
scrutiny. Id. at 642. By contrast, if "unrelated to the content of speech," a regulation is
subjected to a more forgiving "intermediate level of scrutiny," id., sometimes described as
a lesser "substantial government interest" test for "incidental" burdens involved in time,
manner, place restrictions. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See
generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
758 (1997). In application, compelled speech or silence has rarely survived these
constitutional tests. As the Barnette Court put it, "[i]f there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us." 319 U.S. at 642.
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When a multi-judge court publishes an opinion without dissent,
the implication is that all the participating judges agree with the
judgment (if not with every word of the opinion). If judges who in
fact disagree are nevertheless required to remain silent, they are in
effect compelled to join a message they in fact dispute.52 Whether
this is viewed as compelled silence or as compelled "speech-by-
conduct" (affirmatively conveying the message "I agree") seems
largely moot. Not only does a compelled unanimity rule mislead the
parties and the public,53 but it intrudes on the judge's right as a citizen
not to be compelled to join in a message with which s/he does not
agree. Judges do not lose their constitutional rights when they don
their robes. Unless a governmental interest exists so compelling as to
override judges' First Amendment interests, one could easily
conclude that judges have a First Amendment right to note their
dissents publicly.54
An overriding governmental interest in banning simple public
indications of judicial disagreement is difficult to perceive. Although
Learned Hand and others have asserted that judicial non-unanimity
can be "disastrous because disunity cancels the impact of monolithic
solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely
depends, ' 55 the reality is that our Republic and its legal system has
52. This is, of course, an empirical assertion which might, I suppose, be subject to
empirical refutation. Professor Ed Hartnett of Seton Hall has reminded me that prior to
the 1970 Term, the official U.S. reports did not list who "joined" in the majority opinion.
(Perhaps not coincidentally, the practice changed one year after Warren Burger became
Chief Justice and Justice Brennan began his dissenting career). It may be that our shared
understanding of the meaning of judicial silence has changed over time. My only assertion
is that today, not dissenting is generally perceived as "joining." Accord, Hon. Antonin
Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. Cr. HIST. 33, 42. If this perception were to
change, perhaps analysis of a First Amendment "right" to dissent would also change.
53. See Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 350 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting)
("I am of the opinion.., that upon constitutional questions, the public have a right to
know the opinion of every judge who dissents... and the reasons of his dissent."). The
suggestion that the public may have a separate right to demand an explanation of rationale
from dissenting judges is an interesting one which I do not further pursue here.
54. But see infra text accompanying notes 62-64. It should go without saying, I think,
that judges retain a First Amendment right to express their dissenting views privately to
their colleagues. Moreover, since which view will be the "majority" cannot be known until
all competing views have been considered and voted upon, private expression of
disagreeing views is also essential to the judicial function. See Scalia, supra note 52, at 41-
42. Thus the Article III and First Amendment arguments tend to merge on this question.
See also infra note 61.
55. LEARNED HAND, supra note 28, at 72; see also Justice White, supra note 28. Judge
Hand actually made this remark not as a critique of dissents, but rather in the course of
discussing the power of judicial review. See HAND supra, at 72. Thus, while often quoted
out of context as powerful criticism of judicial dissent, the remark is in fact far from so
direct. Indeed, as Judge Frank Altimari has demonstrated, Judge Hand unflinchingly
issued dissenting opinions when he felt it necessary. See Frank X. Altimari, The Practice
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flourished despite (or perhaps because of) a long and deep tradition
of judicial dissents. Indeed, arguments that responsible judicial
dissent actually strengthens the overall force of the law and the
judiciary seem at least as formidable as arguments to the contrary.56
As the unanimous Barnette court noted, the First Amendment can be
applied "with no fear that freedom to be intellectually.., contrary
will disintegrate the social organization.... Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard. '57 Applying accepted principles, then, it seems plausible
to conclude that the First Amendment prohibits a governmental
coercion of judicial silence in the face of a disagreeable majority
opinion.
While I have found no reported decision precisely on point, an
interesting parallel for this First Amendment argument can be found
in a 1989 D.C. Circuit opinion (later vacated as moot), Clarke v.
United States.58 Dissatisfied with a local District of Columbia court
decision, Congress passed legislation directing the D.C. city council to
enact a specific local law that would have overridden the offending
judicial decision.59 The city council sued, claiming that by compelling
its members to vote oppositely to their desires, the statute violated
the legislators' First Amendment speech rights. The district court,
and then a panel of the D.C. Circuit, agreed. Because the law
"coerced an 'individual... expression of opinion'," and because no
strong governmental interest supported abridging the legislators' First
Amendment rights, the congressional directive was declared
unconstitutional. 6°
of Dissenting in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 275,282-83 (1993). Notably, Judge
Altimari also suggests inferentially that judges may have a right to dissent even in the face
of contrary precedent. Id. at 278 & n.10.
56. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 52, at 35 ("I have no doubt that ... announced dissents
augment rather than diminish [the Supreme Court's] prestige") and passim (giving
reasons).
57. Id. Former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote in the same vein in 1928:
"There are those who think it desirable that dissents should not be disclosed as they
detract from the force of the judgment. Undoubtedly they do .... But unanimity which is
merely formal, which is recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not
desirable .... because what must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the
character and independence of the judges." HUGHES, supra note 28, at 67.
58. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
59. 886 F.2d at 405-06.
60. Id. at 413-17. Congress's interests were deemed insufficient primarily because
Congress had authority to modify the law directly, without compelling the D.C. council
members to act. See id. at 414; accord, id. at 418 (Buckley, J., concurring). Because
Congress later took this alternative route to amend the D.C. Code before the appellate
mandate had issued, the en banc D.C. Circuit vacated the panel's opinion as moot. See 915
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If the vacated Clarke stated good law, the analogy seems clear.
Just as Congress may not constitutionally compel legislators to cast
(or appear to be casting) votes in which they do not believe, so (the
argument goes) judges cannot constitutionally be compelled to cast
(or appear to cast) votes from which they actually wish to dissent.61
Yet, as my colleague Vik Amar has pointed out to me, judges
certainly can be compelled to "vote" in a certain way, by way of
mandamus, for example, or when a case is remanded by a higher
court with clear instructions on how it must be handled below. In
such situations, judicial compliance is not merely a "vote" expressing
an opinion, but also an act.
I think there is great merit in this distinction. It might well be
argued that judges have no "right" to dissent when their expression is
coupled with a judicial act which denies parties relief in contradiction
of clear and unquestionable authority.62 Yet the Supreme Court has
noted that mandamus, for example, is restricted "to situations where
ministerial duties of a nondiscretionary nature are involved." 63 Thus
F.2d at 700. See also Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 274 (1990)(declining to
address the First Amendment validity of a court order directing city council members to
enact legislation because they previously had agreed to enact the law as part of a consent
decree). Justice Brennan's dissent in Spallone also did not address the First Amendment
question, but rather was premised on legislators "acting outside of their 'sphere of
legitimate legislative activity,"' as well as the "scourge of racial politics" shown in the case.
Id. at 305, 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
61. Notably, the Clarke panel also rejected a fallback argument made by the
government, that the less restrictive constitutional standard applied to regulation of
speech of government employees in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
ought to apply to the D.C. council members. The panel characterized this claim as
"obviously wrong" because elected lawmakers are not employees but rather "independent
legislators... presumed to express their personal will when they vote." 886 F.2d at 416.
One imagines that whether or not this is true of the D.C. city council, it must surely be
true regarding our independent federal judiciary, or the constitutional principles of
separation of powers and judicial review are sapped of content. In addition, one imagines
that dissenting judicial opinions are, by their very nature and context, speech on "matters
of public concern," which is still accorded substantial constitutional protection in the
public employment context. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385-87 (1987). "The
Court long ago rejected Justice Holmes' approach to the free speech rights of public
employees, that '[a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no right to be a policeman."' Id. at 395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)). It can be
argued that the essence of a judge's governmental job is to express opinions about the
matters that come before him or her (but cf. authorities cited infra note 74). A judge is, in
effect, paid by the government for his or her independent opinions. Thus again, see supra
note 54, the Article III and First Amendment arguments tend to coalesce.
62. This, of course, is not what Justice Kline did-his lone dissent was without
consequence for the parties, and moreover addressed precedent which was, indeed, open
to question. See supra notes 38 and 42, and accompanying text.
63. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309,318 (1958).
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the instances in which judges may have an obligation to vote in a
particular way, and not cast a dissenting vote (though they might still
disagree in a concurrence) might be limited to instances when the
relief requested is "nondiscretionary" and the judge's role merely
"ministerial," requiring not the least bit of judgement or discretion.64
The limiting force of this distinction is important. The "right to
dissent" defended here may yet be exercised in the face of precedent
when there is reason to question the continued validity of existing
authority, or where the judicial act is without consequence on the
parties (who otherwise might be said to have a superceding "right" to
the relief that the existing legal system rightly or wrongly provides).
But there is no right to dissent, even with a plea to the First
Amendment, when the requested judicial act is purely ministerial.
Moreover, unless the historical tradition of American judicial
dissent is seen as providing additional content to the argument, the
First Amendment can support at most only a right for judges to
express and publicly note their dissents, not an additional right to
publish their rationales for dissenting. A simple "Judge Little
dissents" would seem sufficient to protect the judge's right not to be
forced to join (or appear to join) a distasteful majority opinion.
Permitting more than this (our hypothetical evil Congress would
argue) costs substantial resources in terms of judge time, court
money, and public disrespect. The dissenting judge can explain why
s/he dissents on his or her own time, in various published contexts
that are hungry for judge-written material. Although Justice Brennan
might well have disagreed, the First Amendment is generally held not
to require the government to subsidize publication of speech.65 Is
there some further constitutional argument that can support a right to
publish dissenting opinions?
E. The Article M Argument
My brief consideration suggests that foundation for this further
principle may best be drawn from the theory of scholarly literature
64. See, e.g., Life & Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Heirs of Wilson, 33 U.S. 291, 302-304
(1834); In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-193 (1991). Justice Brennan appears to
have agreed with the court's early statement of the non-subsidization principle; at least
that is the message conveyed by his lack of dissent [irony intended] from Justice Harlan's
majority opinion in Cammarano v. United States in which Justice Douglas also endorsed
the principle in concurrence. See 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). But
Justice Brennan consistently dissented in later years from the Court's application of the
principle, in the abortion-restriction cases that were relied upon for the principle in Rust.
See 500 U.S. at 192-93. I have little doubt that Justice Brennan would advocate a stronger
First Amendment position here: that the right of a judge to dissent necessarily carries with
it the right to articulate precisely why.
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that condemns the constitutionality of "jurisdiction-stripping"
legislation. In his famous 1953 dialogue, Professor Henry Hart
suggested that despite broad language in the Constitution, Congress
may not act to create "exceptions" to the federal court's appellate
jurisdiction that would "destroy the essential role of the Supreme
Court in the constitutional plan. ' 66 Scholars have elaborated on this
thesis, arguing that there is some "core" meaning to the constitutional
conception of "Supreme Court" upon which Congress cannot
intrude.67
The idea that the words used in the constitution carry some
contemporaneous, well-accepted core meaning which, although not
detailed, was (or would have been) obvious to the constitutional
Framers, and thus must be counted as a part of the Constitution's
literal meaning, is a traditional one in constitutional interpretation. 68
In the Fourth Amendment area, for example, the Court has often
determined the meaning of "search" or "seizure," as well as
"reasonable," by reference to the state of the common law at the time
of the framing.69 Fundamental constitutional liberties have also been
said to rest on the "traditions ... of our people," 70 and the Court has
recently stressed the contemporary understanding of "sovereign
immunity" in 1794 as the basis for constitutional interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment.71 This essay is not the occasion to pursue the
complexities of constitutional interpretation. I simply suggest that
historical traditions may support an Article III "right" for judges to
issue dissenting opinions.72 Those who would disagree with this claim
66. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953) (emphasis added).
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides broadly that "the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction... with such Exceptions ... as the Congress shall make."
67. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 233-35 (4th ed. 1998) (collecting authorities). Low and
Jeffries note that the theory is not uncontroversial; for example, Professor Martin Redish
has characterized it as "constitutional wishful thinking." Id. at 235 & note m.
68. For a very early expression, see Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 307-08
(1803) ("it is most probable that the members of the first congress, many of them having
been members of the convention which formed the constitution, best knew its meaning
and true construction"). Or as Chief Justice Marshall famously asserted in 1824, "[a]Il
America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce' to
comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when
the constitution was framed." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 190 (1824).
69. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (and citing cases); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in
the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted .... ).
70. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934).
71. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2244-45 (1999).
72. Professor Rebecca Brown has identified a number of contexts in which the
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need to pursue an historical analysis of the practice, empirical work
which, so far as I know, has simply not yet been done.
The argument is a short and simple one, at least on the first
glance that this essay provides: When the Framers expressly endorsed
inferior federal "courts" and "judges" in Article III, they were
familiar with the late eighteenth century practice of common law
judges delivering separate opinions that might not always agree,
whether in the British seriatim style or as dissents. In fact, the
practice of separate, disagreeing judicial opinions was immediately
adopted by the early Supreme Court. 73 Thus the Framers' use of the
words embodied an unarticulated, yet constitutionally enshrined,
conception of "court" and "judge" that included a right to issue
dissenting opinions. This interpretive argument contends that a court
is not a constitutional "court," and a judge not a constitutional
"judge," unless statements of dissenting rationale may be issued to
accompany the majority's own opinions.74
Supreme Court employs historical tradition as "Evidence of What is a 'Right."' Rebecca
L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 200 (1993). One can subdivide this
mode of analysis into "traditionalism" and "originalism." See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl
J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV.
1211, 1241 (1998). Originalism contends that the Constitution embodies, as a sort of
"social contract," the meaning that its words had in 1787 because the Framers actually had
those particular meanings in mind; traditionalism, on the other hand, "is meant to be
persuasive independent of the original intent of the framers or ratifiers of the
Constitution." Id. Perhaps the best case demonstration of these approaches appears in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, in which the majority simply noted the
"respected tradition of anonymity" in political leafleting (which it found protected by the
First Amendment), 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995), while Justice Thomas required a
demonstration of contemporaneous historical practice in 1789 to reach the same
conclusion. See id. at 359, 370 (Thomas, J., concurring).
73. See ZoBell, supra note 4, at 190-91. Although Chief Justice Marshall later
attempted to alter this practice in favor of unvaryingly unanimous Supreme Court
opinions, his effort did not succeed, and indeed, by the end of his tenure Marshall himself
had filed nine dissenting opinions. See id. at 193-96; Kolsky, supra note 4, at 2073-81.
Notably, my colleague and a constitutional scholar of great note, Professor Ray Forrester,
has recently called for a "return to Marshall's style," court opinions without dissents. Ray
Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions-Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 167,179 (1995).
74. In the course of a very different debate, some scholars have asserted that "the
issuance of opinions is not an essential aspect of the judicial power." Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1267, 1328 (1996). Accord, Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter
of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1999) ("As valuable as opinions may be...
they are not necessary to the judicial function .... "). But cf Scalia, supra note 52, at 35-
42. These assertions seem to be functional assessments of the judicial role, rather than
historically-based assertions of what the judicial function was thought to comprehend in
1789. Although Professor John Harrison has noted that "[n]either the Constitution nor
the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the delivery of written opinions," John Harrison,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article
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This argument may be based not only on history but also on an
ideal conception of the judicial function.75 We can return directly to
Justice Brennan's essay for the explication. First, says Justice
Brennan, courts have a duty not just to "declare law" but also to
"explain why and how a given rule has come to be. '76 This is a public
obligation, not merely a private prerogative. If this is so-if courts
have an obligation to articulate their rationales publically-then the
right to dissent can be seen as an essential part of that core judicial
obligation. Dissenting opinions, tethered as they are to the majority's
rationale, are vital for the public to evaluate the strongest views on all
sides of important judicial decisions. They are also arguably
indispensable to engendering legitimate majority rationales. For
without the prospect of published dissenting opinions-opinions to
which the majority must either respond or remain silent at peril of
public puzzlement-courts cannot achieve their most persuasive, and
thereby most legitimate, rationales. As Justice Brennan explained:
"A dissent challenges the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority
and establishes a benchmark against which the majority's reasoning
can continue to be evaluated.. .. ,,77
The right to issue dissenting opinions can therefore be seen as
III, 64 U. CHi. L. REV., 203, 230 (1997), this silence could as likely have been predicated
on the obviousness of judicial opinion writing; a negative inference is not supported, let
alone required, by the historical record. Indeed, a far better source for discovering the
contemporary understanding of the Framers might be Chief Justice Marshall's famous
assertion: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
75. Thus Justice Brennan, who steadfastly rejected adherence to "stagnant, archaic,
hidebound" historical traditions if they did not accord with his interpretation of "the living
charter that I have taken to be our Constitution," Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
141 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting), would give weight to the historical practice of judicial
dissent, but would further ask whether that tradition is consistent with our contemporary
ideal of "judge" and "court." One imagines Justice Brennan would have concluded that
the lessons of history produce a happy convergence with his well-developed vision of
judicial dissent.
I must also credit Josh Rosenkranz, Executive Director of the Brennan Center for
Justice in New York, for suggesting yet another constitutional objection to my
hypothetical "no dissents" statute: separation of powers. That is, a self-adopted court rule
banning dissenting opinions might or might not be constitutional. But an order from
Congress to a separate and constitutionally equal Branch, directing judicial branch officers
to behave in a certain manner, could raise very different, serious constitutional questions.
76. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435. See also David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) ("A requirement that judges give reasons for
their decisions-grounds of decisions that can be debated, attacked, and defended-serves
a vital function in constraining the judiciary's exercise of power.").
77. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435. Justice Brennan added: "and perhaps, in time,
superseded." Id. However, the point that some dissents may ripen into majority opinions
someday is a separate, and not necessary, justification for the right to dissent. As Justice
Brennan went on to note, "[m]ost dissents never 'ripen' and do not deserve to." Id. at 436.
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part and parcel of the constitutional conception of a federal "court. '78
Courts cannot perform fully as we want them to unless dissents exist
to provide a measure for public as well as internal evaluation.
Moreover (this argument goes), the right to dissent and to explain
why is intrinsic to sitting as a "judge." The function of "judging"
requires a right to independently report one's views to the public
which the judge serves. This view is not only consistent with our
received history, but can be seen as essential to the constitutional
function of an independent judiciary.
Finally, what might Justice Brennan have thought of the effort to
discipline Justice Kline? We cannot know with certainty, of course,
for unlike Justice Kline sitting on an intermediate state appellate
court, Justice Brennan expressed his views about dissents as a judge
on the Supreme Court of final resort, primarily addressing a docket of
"constitutional imperatives. ' 79 Yet the close of his essay, in which he
defended his own repeated refusals to accept the majority's will
regarding capital punishment, yields strong suspicion that Justice
Brennan would have viewed the effort to discipline Justice Kline as
illegitimate. Justice Brennan recognized, as all responsible jurists
must, the "general duty.., to acquiesce in the rulings of [one's] court
and to take up the battle behind the court's new barricades."80 Yet
matters of conscience must ultimately control. There comes a point
where a judge has not just the right but the duty to say "Here I draw
the line. t81 As for disciplining a judge for such an exercise of judicial
conscience,
"None of us... must ever feel that to express a conviction,
78. As a state judge, Justice Kline would be fully entitled to claim First Amendment
protection, see supra note 47. But the separate argument for dissenting opinions, based on
an implicit meaning of Article III which describes only federal courts and judges, would
have to find some analogy in the California State Constitution to have relevance to Justice
Kline's case. However, a similar state constitutional argument is by no means implausible
in California. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art VI, § 3 (providing that the State shall be divided
into appellate districts consisting of "a court of appeal" staffed by "associate justices");
William Wirt Blume, California Courts in Historical Perspective, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 121,
173 (1970) (explaining that California's intermediate appellate courts were established by
constitutional amendment in 1904). The state's supreme court justices were, of course,
established in the first California Constitution of 1849. See id. at 127. At both of these
times (1849 and 1904), the practice of judicial dissenting opinions appears to have been
well-established, and I am aware of no materials to suggest that the state's constitutional
drafters intended to reject that tradition in establishing their state courts.
79. Brennan, supra note 1, at 437; see also supra note 43.
80. Brennan, supra note 1, at 437; accord, Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on
the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 211,219 (1957).
81. Brennan, supra note 1, at 437. This is essentially a moral, not simply judicial,
assertion. As Martin Luther is reputed to have said, "Here I stand, I cannot do
otherwise." ROLAND H. BAINTON, HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 185
(1950).
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honest and sincerely maintained, is to violate some unwritten law of
manners or decorum." 82
That a rule of judicial conduct is written, and then its general
terms are interpreted to condemn "honest and sincere" expressions of
judicial conscience, would not reduce the force of Justice Brennan's
views on this point.83 Were Justice Brennan with us today, it would
surprise no one to hear him gently chide the California Commission
to "let it go" and turn their attention to more threatening judicial
conduct.
Conclusion
Apologies for breaking the unwritten rule that an introductory
essay ought not exceed the length of the main event. The enviable
succinctness of Justice Brennan's ideas leads to a perverse page
ratio-his shorter essay is nevertheless more meaty than the
foregoing. As for my sketch of the constitutional foundation for a
judicial right to dissent, I hope the reader finds it stimulating.
History, the First Amendment, and the constitutional meaning of
"courts" and "judges" might all be argued to support the conception.
Of course, dissent from this suggestion is your right.
82. Brennan, supra note 1, at 437.
83. Moreover, to interpret the judicial Canons' general language for the first time
specifically to prohibit dissents such as Justice Kline's, see supra note 41, would raise
serious constitutional notice and vagueness problems, objections that also would be near
and dear to Justice Brennan's heart.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
